PPT-Signaling and Reputation in Repeated Games

Charles Roddie Nuffield College Oxford What is reputation Link between what an agent has done in past and what he is expected to do in future Two approaches Exact

supermodular signaling stage game signaling supermodular game stage equilibrium stackelberg type types period function higher repeated amp payoff riley

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