PPT-Solving Imperfect-Information Games with CFR

Noam Brown Carnegie Mellon University Computer Science Department Review ImperfectInformation Game Tree Information set 03 05 02 05 05 Negotiations security poker

sum regret action cfr regret sum cfr action iteration payoff strategy game equilibrium player average minimization reach warm abstraction starting iterations nash

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